VALUE THEORY AND THE ACADEMIC RESPECTABILITY BARRIER
We often claim that SCIENCE & SOCIETY has a long shelf life. Work published in S&S
often resurfaces long after its first appearance, and has (what might be called) a
high organic composition of impact: a high ratio of indirect to direct influence and
citation. We are always pleased to have an opportunity to illustrate. To wit: the
New York Review of Books (issue of November 6, 2003) carried an excerpt from
Gary Wills' new book, Negro President: Jefferson and the Slave Power. Wills (the
prolific writer on American history, Roman Catholicism and much else) cites a
study by eminent historian Russell B. Nye, "The Slave Power Conspiracy,
18301860," which appeared in S&S, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer 1946).1 Nye's polemical object was an influential 1921 article by Chauncey Boucher; the latter denied
the existence of a dominant and aggressive pro-slavery power in the ante-bellum
United States. Now Wills draws upon Nye's refutation, which examines in detail
the misrepresentation resulting from the three-fifths clause in the U. S. Constitution, and catalogs the many ways in which the slavocracy dominated political life.
There is, of course, much more to say about both Nye's article and Wills'
book. But the proximate moral of the story is this. Publishing in SCIENCE & SOCIETY
is a good way to influence future generations of scholars in your field. It is the key
to immortality -- the only one, in fact, that is consistent with philosophical materialism. (Of course, to achieve this you must write a seminal paper, but that should
not be too difficult for members of the S&S community.)
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A colleague recently surprised me by asking: "Is it true that even the Marxists
have abandoned the labor theory of value?" I was not sure who "the Marxists"
were; I was (and am) also painfully aware that Marx's value theory has come under
attack from the moment of its emergence, and that this attack has generally been
more intense and total than that directed against many other aspects of Marx's
legacy. The idea of a substance of value -- abstract social labor -- constituting
both a qualitative social reality and a quantitative dimension underlying the perceived exchange values of commodities has been made to seem so far removed from
the core commitments of social science as to be, well, bizarre, and embarrassing.
The co-editors of a recent collection on heterodox economics wrote, in the margin
of a paper on value that I had submitted for inclusion in the collection: "The
tertium comparationis2 is not sustainable." No argument; just the assertion, as if
that were enough. So it has never been surprising that many Marxist writers, from
Oskar Lange to Ian Steedman and the post-Sraffians, and then to the Analytical or
Rational Choice school, have placed the theory of value outside of their purview.
One could, of course, look more deeply at the reasons for this rejection, or
cite the many currents within Marxist political economy that do not share it. I was,
however, interested in what prompted my colleague's question, and she referred
me to an excellent "Symposium on Class Analysis" that appeared in the American
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 105, No. 6 (May 2000).
The lead paper in the symposium ("Toward a Sounder Basis for Class
Analysis") is by Aage B. Sørensen of Harvard University. It begins from the
premise that "there has been agreement that the original conception of exploitation
proposed by Marx is untenable. It is based on a labor theory of value abandoned
long ago, even by Marxist economists" (1524). This was the source of my friend's
query. The symposium continues with critiques or comments by Erik Olin Wright,
John H. Goldthorpe, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer & James Mahoney.
Sørensen proposes to replace Marx's theory of exploitation with one based on
rent. In essentials, the idea is this. A perfectly competitive (capitalist) economy is
one in which full mobility of resources exists, and every asset ("capital"; labor)
therefore receives its "supply price": ". . . what is needed to bring out the supply of
the asset" (1537). Whenever an asset holder can use natural or artificial means to
restrict the supply of the asset held and thus receive a price greater than the
competitive supply price, the result is rent. This is exploitation, and exploitation is
the basis for a class analysis that transcends the less ambitious levels with which
sociology has historically contended: class based on life chances along many
dimensions. Sørensen thus seeks to incorporate important aspects of Marx's
approach to social class into his framework: classes are social groups in a position
of structured antagonism, with the welfare of each of two classes in this binary
relationship depending inversely on that of the other. Exploitation involves
exclusion of the exploited group from access to resources, an exclusion marked by
the capture of rents.
This approach, however, yields some surprising conclusions, which do not (to
put it mildly) square well with long-standing intuition. First, as Wright observes in
his response (1561), "capitalist property relations by themselves do not generate
classes" or exploitation. Moreover, rents are, as Sørensen notes, heterogeneous,
and much of his paper is devoted to detailing this heterogeneity. When workers
restrict the supply of labor by forming unions, they generate rents in the form of
wages higher than the "supply price" of labor, and therefore become an exploiting
class. Minimum wage legislation and the welfare state also reduce inequality by
creating rents. In fact, the entire thrust of the recent conservative political trend in
most capitalist countries is toward rent destruction, and this is the source of the
widely observed increase in inequality. Sørensen is in fact an advocate of social and
political measures to mitigate inequality and protect low-income sectors of the
population, and according to his own definitions, therefore, he is an advocate of
rent, and exploitation. It also becomes very unclear how exploitation classes
formed on the basis of rent extraction could be the basis for political mobilization.
Somewhat contradictorily, Sørensen writes: "It is to the advantage of the capitalist
class to produce a labor market conforming to the assumption of neoclassical
economics . . . capitalism in the last decades has been successful in eliminating
rents to labor" (1554). This "capitalist class," however, is apparently not a "class"
according to the rent definition, so the source of its agency and power is not clear.
In his "Reflections on Sørensen's 'Sounder Basis'," Erik Olin Wright proceeds
from within the Analytical Marxist tradition, and therefore proposes that "a
rigorous concept of exploitation can be elaborated without the use of the labor
theory of value" (1559).3 Wright identifies two elements in the definition of
exploitation that he shares with Sørensen -- the inverse interdependent welfare
principle, and the exclusion principle -- but then argues that a third criterion must
be added, which he calls "the appropriation principle": "Exploiters appropriate the
labor effort of the exploited" (1563). This makes it possible to distinguish between,
e.g., the treatment of indigenous peoples in North America and their treatment in
South Africa. In the latter case, colonizers established a forced system of transfer
of fruits of labor -- exploitation according to Wright's definition. In the former,
because of low population density or for other reasons this was not possible, and
exclusion was enforced by genocide. This was an extreme form of what Wright calls
"nonexploitative oppression," but it was not exploitation. The distinction captures
the "strong sense in which exploiters depend upon and need the exploited" (1565,
italics in original).
Adding the labor-transfer condition also clears up the intuitive mess
generated by Sørensen's rent-based approach. Low-wage workers who form a
union, for example, acquire a rent by Sørensen's definition, but they do not
appropriate the labor of others, and therefore do not form an exploiting class.
Their rents should "be thought of as a mitigation of capitalist exploitation rather
than a form of exploitation in its own right" (1570).
This last formulation, however, presumes the existence of capitalist
exploitation, and Wright's critique therefore rests on his ability to show that in
Sørensen's regime of perfect competition, this exploitation would still be taking
place. He draws on John Roemer's test: would workers be better off if capitalist-owned property were redistributed, thus eliminating their exclusion from the
means of production? (This would establish inverse interdependence.) The
argument is a formal one:
In the initial condition capitalists have a choice of either consuming
their capital or investing it, as well as the choice of whether or not they
will work for earnings. Workers only have the latter choice. To be
sure, they can borrow capital (and in a world of perfect information
they would not need collateral to do so since there would be no
transaction costs, no monitoring costs, no possibility of opportunism),
but still workers would be better off owning capital outright than
having to borrow it. (1566-67.)
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1. The issue also contains (partial listing): "On Science and Social Change," by
Joseph Needham; "Consciousness in the Light of Dialectical Materialism," by
S. L. Rubinstein; "Benedetto Croce and His Concept of Liberty," by Antonio
Gramsci; and reviews by Edwin Berry Burgum, Gaylord Leroy, Ellen Fewkes,
E. J. Hobsbawm, and Margaret Schlauch. Rooting about in S&S' past is
always an adventure!
2. Tertium comparationis: the third element contained in two qualitatively
distinct commodities, which renders them quantitatively comparable. See
Capital, I, ch. 1.
3. In this brief review I am simplifying the arguments of both Sørensen and
Wright, and ignoring the contributions of Goldthorpe and Rueschemeyer &
Mahoney, which contain valuable insights moving in other directions.
It should be noted that Marx never used the term "labor theory of
value." He refers most often to the "law of value." While writers of an
orthodox bent cite this fact, contextual evidence suggests that grasping the
substance of value as consisting of abstract social labor time is central to the
"law of value" as Marx conceived it, and the presentation of (labor) value as
underlying exchange value in Capital, I, ch. 1 is crystal clear. The term "labor
theory of value," then, may not be a serious distortion of his intentions.
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